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Interstate Enforcement of Arbitration Awards
and Judgments
A. M. Stanger*
A N A"ITRATION, if completed, results in an award. That award
must be enforced. In order to do so, it is necessary to enter
judgment with respect thereto. The first problem is the acquisi-
tion of personal jurisdiction over the defendant for this purpose,
in the event that it has not already been acquired previously in
connection with proceedings to compel arbitration. The subject
of acquiring jurisdiction will not be dealt with in this note be-
cause it does not differ too much from the general problems of
acquiring jurisdiction in personam with respect to proceedings
to compel jurisdiction.
We shall therefore be concerned particularly with the prob-
lems of conflicts of laws in the enforcement of the award or judg-
ment on the award.
Conflict of Laws Problems
The general rule is that an award which is valid according to
the place where it is rendered and legal by the law of the place
where it is to be enforced, is enforceable in the forum.' The sec-
ond half of the aforesaid proposition represents the old doctrine of
public policy of the forum, as transcending the lex loci contractus.
The award after all is not a judgment, and not entitled to full
faith and credit. While it cannot be attacked on the merits of the
controversy, nevertheless, when it is sought to be enforced, all
of the procedural questions as to the conduct of the arbitrators
and the parties, as well as the substantive questions of the mak-
ing and validity of the arbitration contract, are available for re-
view. All this would not be any different with respect to a foreign
award than with respect to an intrastate award. However, where
questions can arise (and not all of these have been answered)
is where the award is sought to be enforced in a state which no
longer recognizes the common law method of enforcement. In
such circumstances, the foreign award very likely will not be
* B.BA., LL.B., LL.M., J.S.D.; Member of the New York Bar, N. Y. City;
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1 73 A. L. R. 1460 n. and cases cited.
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eligible for enforcement as a statutory award in the forum either,
since statutory awards within the forum must arise out of a com-
pliance with statutory procedure throughout, and generally with
the holding of the arbitration within the forum, and often with
the prior making of the submission a rule of the court. Hence,
apparently the only remedy would be to secure a judgment on
the award in the jurisdiction where rendered and then sue on the
judgment in the forum. This may not be easy if personal juris-
diction cannot be had over the defendant in the original juris-
diction.
The New York Cases
The New York courts have had occasion to rule both on
enforcement of a foreign award by a common law action for
judgment on the award, and by a statutory motion to confirm the
award. The law in the former situation has been clearly enunci-
ated in Gilbert v. Burnstine.2 There, it was held that where
parties had agreed to arbitrate in England according to its laws,
an award rendered could be enforced by an action on the award.
The court stated, however, that it reserved the right to examine
the English proceeding to ascertain if there had been compliance
with such procedure. This is, of course, the classic right. Even
in an action on a judgment, questions of jurisdiction in the origi-
nal forum can be properly raised and litigated.
On the other hand, it seems equally clear that New York
will not permit the entry of judgment on an award by the mere
statutory motion to confirm.
Thus, in United Artists' Corp. v. Gottesman,3 the Supreme
Court, New York County, refused to grant a motion to confirm a
Massachusetts award. In doing so it relied on Skandinaviska
Granit Aktiebolaget v. Weiss. 4 This latter case, however, was
not really in point, as it involved an action in New York on a
Swedish judgment based on an arbitration award rendered with-
out jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, and did not
really involve a question of enforcing a foreign award in New
York.
However, in 1948, in United Electrical Radio and Machine
2 255 N. Y. 348, 174 N. E. 706 (1931).
3 135 Misc. 92; 236 N. Y. S. 623 (Sup. Ct. N. Y. 1929).
4 226 App. Div. 56, 234 N. Y. S. 202 (2d Dep't 1929).
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Workers of America (U.E.) v. General Electric Co.5 the New
York County Supreme Court again refused to permit statutory
confirmation of a Massachusetts award despite the execution of
the original contract in New York. The court also cited the
California Packing case 6 which, in support of a refusal to direct
arbitration in a foreign jurisdiction, had stated: "no award taken
without the State may be the basis of a judgment" in this State.
The court, there, was of course referring to a judgment via a
statutory motion.
Again, in Landerton Co., Inc. v. Public Service Heat and
Power Co., Inc.,7 the Queens County Supreme Court refused to
confirm an award which the parties by stipulation had designated
a Connecticut award, despite the fact that the arbitrators had
held many of the hearings in New York and rendered and
acknowledged the award in New York.
Thus, it is now settled in New York that the statutory pro-
cedure is not available to enforce a foreign award, but that an
action on the award will lie.
A collateral question is of interest. Under Section 1458 of
the New York Civil Practice Act, a failure to move for a stay
subsequent to service of a statutory notice to arbitrate there-
after precludes the raising, as a defense, of the making of the
arbitration contract and the failure to comply therewith. If then,
such a notice has been served in New York, should not a foreign
forum give effect to the New York procedure and likewise pre-
vent the raising of these issues? To date there has been no de-
cision on this point, but it would appear that a state like Wash-
ington s , which has a similar provision, would give effect to the
New York procedure; and of course, New York should hold so
with respect to a Washington award. Further, the modern juris-
dictions would probably do likewise, though this is somewhat
conjectural.
Other State Jurisdictions
With respect to the enforcement of foreign awards in state
jurisdictions other than New York, the cases are generally liberal
in favor of the enforcement of such awards.
5 193 Misc. 146; 83 N. Y. S. 2d 768, (Sup. Ct. N. Y. 1948); AfFd. 275 App. Div.
908; 90 N. Y. S. 2d 273.
6 121 Misc. 212, 201 N. Y. S. 158 (Sup. Ct. N. Y. 1923).
7 118 N. Y. S. 2d 84 (Sup. Ct. Q. 1952).
8 Rev. Code of Wash., Tit. 7, Sec. 7.04.060.
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In Alabama it has been held9 that an action could be brought
to enforce an award rendered pursuant to arbitration hearings
held partly in Alabama and partly in Tennessee and pertaining
to realty partly in Tennessee, where the award was made in
conformance with Alabama Law.
On the other hand, the Georgia courts in Wright Graham &
Co. v. Hammond' refused to permit the enforcement of an
English award as a common law award, because the award had
been rendered subject to the English statute and was thus
statutory. It was, however, not made pursuant to Georgia Stat-
utes, and thus not enforceable as a statutory award there either.
Earlier, in Georgia, however, in the case of Green v. The E.
Tennessee & Georgia Railroad,1 it was held that an award in
Tennessee based on an oral submission valid in Tennessee was
available as a bar to an equity unit in Georgia, although Georgia,
the forum, required a written submission, on the ground that a
mere failure to comply with the formalities of the lex fori is not
a disqualification of an otherwise valid submission and award.
On the question of public policy and illegality, the Georgia
courts have held, in Benton v. Singelton,'2 that an award valid
in New York where rendered, was not enforceable in Georgia,
in an action on the award. This was for the reason that the un-
derlying futures transaction was illegal as a gaming transaction
in Georgia. The Court thus declared without doubt that an
award did not have the sanctity of a judgment, and that the
courts could and should deny enforcement on public policy
grounds in the forum.
In Titus v. Scantling,13 an action was brought in Indiana on an
arbitration bond executed in Ohio which, however, failed to in-
clude a provision that the submission be made a rule of the court
as required by the Indiana and Ohio statutes. The court pointed
out that at common law this was not required, and in the absence
of evidence to the contrary it was presumed that the common law
was in force in Ohio. Hence the bond and submission were valid
as a common law bond and submission and enforceable as such
in Indiana.
In a 1916 case in Missouri, the parties had executed a sub-
9 Edmundson v. Wilson, 108 Ala. 118, 19 So. 367 (1936).
10 41 Ga. Appl. 738, 154 S. E. 649 (1930).
11 37 Ga. 456 (1867).
12 114 Ga. 548, 40 S. E. 811, 58 L. R. A. 181 (1902).
13 4 Blackf. (Ind.) 89 (1835).
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mission in Indiana for arbitration in Indiana by The National
Hay Association. 4 The Missouri arbitration statute did not re-
quire a submission to be made a rule of the court. In Indiana the
submission had to be made a rule of the court or it was not
statutory. The Missouri court permitted an action on the Indiana
award because it recognized that in Indiana such a submission
was valid at common law.
Prior to the enactment of the modern arbitration statute in
Ohio, the courts there, in the Shafer case, 15 refused to enforce a
New York award rendered pursuant to an agreement providing
that it was to be construed in accordance with the laws of New
York and the award to be enforced by any court of competent
jurisdiction. The defendant revoked before the rendering of the
award, on the ground that in Ohio the agreement was only a
common law agreement and hence revocable before the award.
The distinguishing feature here, of course, was that the defendant
revoked the agreement to arbitrate in time. Had he not done so,
the Ohio courts very likely would have enforced the award.
Washington, too, has held in accordance with the general
rule. In Taylor v. Basye,16 an arbitration was held in Oregon
which did not comply with the formalities of Washington or
Oregon. While Washington did not recognize common law arbi-
trations, it nevertheless allowed the award as a valid defense to
a suit in Washington, since it was valid as a common law award
in Oregon, the place where made.
It seems, therefore, well settled that while an award does
not have the sanctity of a judgment, the state jurisdictions will
enforce an award if it complies with the laws of the state where
rendered or, better yet, if there is no evidence that it does not
comply with same. This is subject to the limitation that it must
not transgress the public policy of the forum.
Furthermore, the fact that a state does not provide for the
enforcement of agreements to arbitrate future disputes should
not be a bar to the enforcement of an award rendered elsewhere
based on such an arbitration clause, because although such
clauses may be revocable and unenforceable in the forum, they
are generally not illegal or against public policy, and even in such
14 Thatcher Implement & Mercantile Co. v. Brubaker, 193 Mo. App. 627,
187 S. W. 117 (1916).
15 Shafer v. M. G. M. Dist. Corp., 36 Ohio App. 31, 172 N. E. 689 (1929).
16 119 Wash. 263, 205 P. 16 (1922).
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forum, if no revocation takes place before the award is rendered,
the award is valid.1 7
Cases in the Federal Courts
Under Section 9 of the Federal Arbitration Act, a motion
to confirm may be made if the arbitration agreement provides
for the entry of judgment on the award. Otherwise, a common
law action on the award lies even under the Federal Arbitration
Act.
Furthermore, the question in the federal courts will often
involve the enforcement of an award made under state law where
it is sought to bring an action on the award in a diversity case.
Thus, in Tejas Development Co. v. McGough Bros.'s a diversity
action was brought on a Texas award not in interstate commerce,
wherein the defendant alleged timely revocation of the submis-
sion. The court held that the validity of the award should be
governed by Texas law, under Erie v. Tompkins.19
Also in United Fuel Gas Co. v. Columbian Fuel Corp.20 the
Fourth Circuit granted a decree in equity enforcing an award
rendered in a rate-making case, pursuant to a submission which
specifically provided that the award could be entered as a judg-
ment of the Circuit Court of Kanawa County, West Virginia and
be enforced in accordance with the West Virginia arbitration
statute. The court held that this submission did not preclude the
federal courts from enforcing the award as at common law.
In the federal courts, then, regardless of the fact that the
arbitration may have been held under state law, if the award is
valid where made, the federal courts will permit action on the
award in the federal courts in diversity cases. It goes without
saying that if there has been federal jurisdiction under the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act, each district will enforce awards made in
other districts.
17 Domke: "On the Enforcement Abroad of American Arbitration Awards."
17 Law & Contemp. Problems 545 (1952) at 554 states that such awards are
now enforceable in non-modern forums and cites cases in support of his
thesis. All of the cases cited are, however, cases where a judgment had first
been rendered on the award and only the judgment was being enforced
in the forum. Under the doctrine of Fauntleroy v. Lum, note 29 infra, such
judgment would be enforceable constitutionally or by express federal
statute in any event and the cases are no authority for his proposition. See
note, Commercial Arbitration and The Conflict of Laws, 56 Col. L. R. 902
(1956) in criticism of the Domke thesis.
18 165 F. 2d 276 (5th Cir. 1948).
19 304 U. S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188 (1938).
20 165 F. 2d 746 (4th Cir. 1948).
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The enforcement of interstate awards is then fairly liberal
in the absence of illegality or public policy reasons, despite the
fact that an award is not a judgment within the Full Faith and
Credit Clause.21
Enforcement of Judgments Entered Outside the Forum
Judgments which have been entered on awards are no differ-
ent from other judgments. This means that a judgment rendered
by a state court enjoys the benefits of enforceability in sister states
under the Full Faith and Credit Clause. 22 In addition, such judg-
ment must also be given full faith and credit in the federal courts
as a result of federal statute of long standing.23 Furthermore,
such a judgment rendered in a federal court, of course is entitled
to enforceability in all the federal courts since these are one
judicial system. So too, by judicial decision, a judgment ren-
dered by a federal court must be given the same faith and credit
by a state court as a judgment rendered by a court of the state
in which the federal court is sitting.24
The above rules, however, are no panacea or automatic as-
surance of enforcement of all judgments rendered on awards.
While they mean that the merits of the judgment are not subject
21 U. S. Const. Art. IV, Sec. 1: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each
State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other
State. And the Congress may be general Laws prescribe the Manner in
which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect
thereof."
22 Ibid.
23 U. S. C., Tit. 28, Sec. 1738: "State and Territorial statutes and judicial
proceedings; full faith and credit.
"The Acts of the legislature of any State, Territory, or Possession of
the United States, or copies thereof, shall be authenticated by affixing the
seal of such State, Territory or Possession thereto.
"The records and judicial proceedings of any court of any such State,
Territory or Possession or copies thereof, shall be proved or admitted in
other courts within the United States and its Territories and Possessions by
the attestation of the clerk and seal of the court annexed, if a seal exists,
together with a certificate of a judge of the court that the said attestation
is in proper form.
"Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so
authenticated, shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within
the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law
or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which
they are taken."
24 Cf., Crescent City Live-Stock Landing, etc., Co. v. Butchers' Union
Slaughter-House, etc., Co., 120 U. S. 141, 7 S. Ct. 472, 30 L. Ed. 614 (1887);
Metcalf v. City of Watertown, 153 U. S. 671, 14 S. Ct. 947, 38 L. Ed. 861
(1894); Hancock Nat'l. Bank v. Farnum, 176 U. S. 640, 20 S. Ct. 506, 44 L.
Ed. 619 (1900); Supreme Lodge Knights of Pythias v. Meyer, 265 U. S. 30,
44 S. Ct. 432, 68 L. Ed. 885 (1924); Ganow v. Ashton, 32 S. D. 458, 143 N. W.
383 (1913).
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to review, nevertheless in all cases judgments may be challenged
for want of jurisdiction of the person or subject matter. 25 How-
ever, there is a presumption of jurisdiction where the judgment
on its face appears to have been rendered by a court of general
jurisdiction.2 6
The case of Jackson v. Kentucky River Mills27 is an out-
standing illustration of these principles as applied to the field of
arbitration. There, the arbitration contract provided that the
award could be enforced under the laws of the State, County or
Government having jurisdiction, and also provided for arbitra-
tion in New York, with a provision that an ex parte arbitration
could be had on default. Despite this, the Federal District Court,
sitting in Kentucky, refused enforcement of a judgment ren-
dered on the award in New York, because of inadequate per-
sonal jurisdiction in the New York courts in connection with the
confirmation of the award. In permitting the defendant to chal-
lenge the jurisdiction, the Court stated that it was a familiar rule
that where judgment is rendered by the courts of one state and
is sought to be enforced in another state, such latter state may
question the validity of the judgment both for want of jurisdic-
tion over the person and the subject matter.
Sometimes a question may arise as to what is a judgment,
but apparently as long as the statute of the state where ren-
dered provides for the entry of judgment in a particular manner,
and if that manner has been complied with, the judgment is
entitled to full faith and credit. Thus, where the statute of a
particular state provides that the mere filing of an award results
in a judgment thereunder, such judgment is entitled to full faith
and credit.2
8
If however, the judgment is not based on infirmities of juris-
diction, it is practically impregnable even when based on prin-
ciples contrary to the public policy of the forum where enforce-
ment is sought. The leading case in the arbitration field and
perhaps on the entire subject is Fauntleroy v. Lum. 29 There, an
arbitration was held between two citizens and residents of Mis-
25 Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U. S. 457, 61 S. Ct. 339, 85 L. Ed. 278 (1940);
Adams v. Saenger, 303 U. S. 59, 58 S. Ct. 454, 82 L. Ed. 649 (1938); Grover
& Baker Sewing Machine Co. v. Radcliffe, 137 U. S. 287, 11 S. Ct. 92, 34 L.
Ed. 670 (1890); Thompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall. 457, 21 L. Ed. 897 (1874).
26 Adams v. Saenger, note 25, supra.
27 65 F. Supp. 601 (E. D. Ky. 1946).
28 Wernag v. Pawling, 5 G. & J. 500 (Md. 1833).
29 210 U. S. 230, 28 S. Ct. 641, 52 L. Ed. 1039 (1908).
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sissippi on a transaction involving dealing in futures, which was
considered gambling and therefore illegal under the laws of the
State of Mississippi, the place of arbitration. In a suit in Mis-
sissippi on the award, the claim was dismissed for illegality.
Thereafter, the party in whose favor the award had been made
brought an action on the award in Missouri, after succeeding in
serving the adverse party personally in Missouri, and a judg-
ment was rendered on the award. Subsequently, an action was
brought in Mississippi upon such judgment, and after denial of
enforcement by the Supreme Court of Mississippi the case went
to the United States Supreme Court. Mr. Justice Holmes, citing
the familiar rules and cases on the subject of full faith and credit,
reversed the Mississippi Supreme Court and held that the Mis-
souri judgment was entitled to full faith and credit, inasmuch
as it was a judgment rendered by a sister state and jurisdiction
was not being challenged. The defendant was no longer in a
position to question the merits of the controversy, as it appeared
before the Missouri court. It is interesting to compare this case
with the case of Benton v. Singleton,30 because it is a good ex-
ample of the differences between an award and judgment on an
award as regards full faith and credit. While illegality of the
lex loci is sufficient to invalidate an award, it cannot, once a
judgment has been rendered thereon, constitute a ground for
challenging such judgment in a sister state.
The Supreme Court having spoken on the subject quite
emphatically, it is now beyond doubt the rule that if the judg-
ment on the award is not subject to attack for lack of jurisdiction,
questions of public policy and illegality as well as the merits will
not be reviewed when enforcement is sought in a sister jurisdic-
tion or in the federal courts.31
30 Note 12, supra.
31 See Domke, op. cit. note 17, supra, and cases cited therein.
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